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Pre-capitalist Reproduction on the Nepal
Tarai: Semi-feudal Agriculture in an Era of
Globalisation
FRASER SUGDEN
International Water Management Institute, Kathmandu, Nepal
ABSTRACT This article highlights the continued significance of pre-capitalist formations in shap-
ing the trajectory of economic transition in peripheral regions, even in an era of neo-liberal
globalisation. There is a tendency for Marxist scholars to assume the inevitable “dominance” of
capitalism over older modes of production. Using a case study from Nepal’s far eastern Tarai, this
paper seeks to understand the reproduction of feudal social relations in a region which is both
accessible and integrated into regional and global markets. The paper traces the early subordina-
tion of indigenous groups to feudalism from the eighteenth century onwards, and the political and
ideological processes through which these social relations were reinforced. Through examining the
historical role of feudal-colonial alliances, however, the paper notes that pre-capitalist reproduction
in Nepal is a dynamic process, actively negotiated and reinforced by the external imperatives of
capitalist expansion itself as well as through the entrenched political power of landed classes. Today
feudal and capitalist formations co-exist and articulate, with surplus divided between landlords and
non-farm employers. Understanding the complex dynamics of feudal or “semi-feudal” reproduction
in an era of globalisation is crucial if one is to identify avenues for collective mobilisation against
inequitable pre-capitalist and capitalist class relations.
KEY WORDS: Nepal, Tarai, Madhesh, semi-feudalism, pre-capitalist, mode of production, agrarian
change, articulation
Throughout the world, economic restructuring has facilitated the expansion of capitalist
social relations in unprecedented ways. However, Marxian theorists are often too quick to
assume the inevitable “victory” of capitalism over older modes of production, glossing
over the vast diversity and complexity of pre-capitalist formations. In this context Nepal
represents an interesting case study, being a country with a history of relative seclusion
from direct integration into capitalist markets, and a preponderance of pre-capitalist social
relations in rural areas (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2001). However, does this descrip-
tion still apply in the context of a liberalised economy, expansion of transport infrastruc-
ture and efforts to commercialise agriculture through both state and non-state development
initiatives? This paper seeks to address this question using a case study in the far eastern
Tarai plains. It demonstrates that although this region is increasingly integrated into
capitalist markets, the spread of capitalist relations of production is highly selective in
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its extent, with “semi-feudal” social relations remaining predominant in shaping the
trajectory of this unique social formation.
While the distorted character of capitalist expansion in peripheral regions is well
known, there is a need to better understand the processes through which exploitative
pre-capitalist formations are able to persist, particularly in the context of neo-liberal
globalisation. These processes are by no means unitary, and the Nepal case represents
how older modes of production have been reproduced through a matrix of geographically
and historically unique economic, political, and ideological relations. Such questions are
of critical importance in Nepal as it emerges from the decade-long People’s War and
overthrow of the monarchy, and seeks to re-write its constitution. At the time of writing,
political actors on the left had made limited progress in addressing the contradictions
associated with both capitalist imperialism and pre-capitalist under-development.
This paper examines the processes through which feudal relations have remained
entrenched in the far eastern Tarai over the last three centuries, adapting to contemporary
political-economic changes. This study is careful to note, however, that feudalism is by no
means an archaic formation “persisting” in the context of geographical and economic
isolation. Instead, its reproduction has been a dynamic process, actively negotiated and
reinforced by both the external imperatives of imperialism and entrenched social relations
on the ground. It is subject to transformation through both internal contractions, interac-
tions with other modes of production, and the expansion and contraction of diverse
political and cultural formations across the social landscape.
This paper demonstrates how contemporary feudalism in the Tarai has its origins in the
subordination of indigenous communities under early centralised state formations.
Taxation combined with a contracting forest frontier subordinated indigenous groups to
a form of feudalism whereby surplus was shared between a centralised state and an
emerging functionary-landlord class. In the late nineteenth century, alliances between
the ruling classes and colonialism to the south impeded organic industrialisation in the
region and simultaneously reinforced feudal relations.
Although landlordism rather than state taxation had developed into the primary
mechanism of surplus appropriation by the twentieth century, it is shown in this paper
that land remains central to political power in the present era, ensuring feudalism remains
unscathed by cosmetic “land reforms.” Industrial development across the far eastern
lowlands has not drawn labour out of the vast tenant class, and today, the capitalist and
pre-capitalist modes of production supplement each other in a classic articulation. It is
anticipated that a better understanding of pre-capitalist reproduction will offer lessons for
movements seeking social transformation in transitional Nepal and other peripheral
regions.
Mapping the Expansion of Capitalism
It would be difficult to deny that we are living in an era of global capitalist expansion and
crises on an unprecedented scale. We have witnessed the liberalisation drive which
characterised the 1990s and 2000s, imperialist wars driven by resource scarcities, con-
tinued globalisation of production systems, and the rapid expansion of capitalist social
relations in the world’s most populous country, China and its former socialist neighbours.


























pre-capitalist economic formations throughout the world, and their continued role in
shaping development trajectories, particularly in peripheral regions.
There is a tendency for scholarship on globalisation and economic transition to assume
the inevitable growth of capitalist social relations. The peasant enterprise, defined as the
subsistence-orientated family farm utilising primarily household labour (Shanin 1973), is
often considered the basic unit of production in pre-capitalist agrarian economies. In
Capital, Marx (1974) draws on the European experience to suggest that the peasant unit of
production is destined to be disintegrated through differentiation and concentration of the
means of production, separating labour and capital. Discussions of the dissolution of the
small-scale family farm were expanded upon considerably in Lenin’s ([1899] 1960)
classic analysis of capitalist development in Russia, whereby the large farms of the
more competitive kulaks, an emerging agrarian bourgeoisie, displace more marginal
producers. Although these works by Marx and Lenin were based upon historically
specific case studies, they have unfortunately been too often interpreted as representing
an inevitable trend in pre-capitalist economies. For example, studies on India’s Green
Revolution sought to identify processes of class formation in agriculture along these
classical lines (Byres 1981). However, more recent work on agrarian change in the context
of neo-liberal globalisation has also tended to over-emphasise the expansion of capitalist
social relations and differentiation within the peasantry (Bernstein 2003; Akram-Lodhi
2007, 2008).
Scholarship has, for example, demonstrated how processes such as the withdrawal of
the state support for marginal producers and the expanding export-orientated sub-sectors
in peripheral economies intensify peasant differentiation (Oya 2001; Bernstein 2003).
Some studies have even gone as far as to suggest that the drive by capital from more
developed regions to avert crises and locate “super-profits” requires differentiation by
“extra-economic” means (Harvey 2003; Patnaik 2007). Akram-Lodhi (2007) terms this
process of forcible separation “neo-liberal enclosure,” or, as Harvey (2003) terms it,
“accumulation by dispossession.” In the contemporary periphery, for example, this is
characterised by the appropriation of land for capitalist investment and the privatisation of
common property resources, often with the support of foreign capital (Harvey 2003). Such
processes release a global “reserve army” of labour, engaged in increasingly insecure and
oppressive wage employment (Bernstein 2004; Walker 2008), often under conditions of
unfreedom (Brass 1997).
While economic liberalisation, expanding markets and the drive by capital for new
sources of profit may cast doubt over the stability of pre-capitalist modes of production in
peripheral regions, does capitalist expansion necessarily require that older economic
formations be “dissolved?” Can surplus value not be located within pre-capitalist modes
of production as capitalism expands in peripheral regions?
Indeed, some studies have demonstrated how petty commodity production in peripheral
social formations can be functionally articulated to supply surplus to capitalism (Banaji
1977; Bernstein 2003), a process de-Janvry (1981) termed “functional dualism.” For
example, under contract farming, smallholders are institutionally linked to larger capitalist
enterprises, with limited control over what is produced and the prices received (White
1997). In such contexts, it is asserted that peasant farmers create a surplus which is
extracted by the buyer of their crops (Banaji 1977), making them effectively “disguised
proletarians” (Bernstein 1977, 69). The lack of accumulation prevents capitalist differ-
entiation. Other studies have pointed to instances of partial differentiation whereby the

























peasant producer maintains enough land to supply capitalism with cheap labour (de-
Janvry 1981). This draws upon the tendency outlined by both Lenin ([1899] 1960) and
Kautsky ([1899] 1988) for peasants to work on their land as well as being wage workers,
so subsistence agriculture subsidises labour power.
While such studies highlight the important idea that pre-capitalist modes of production
can be preserved, they also have much in common with theories asserting the dissolution
of the peasantry. What both bodies of literature have in common is that they appear to
assume the inevitable subordination of pre-capitalist economic formations to capitalism.
The use of terms such as “disguised proletarians” or indeed “functional dualism” itself
suggests that the persistence of older economic formations is dependent upon capitalism.
However, the literature from Nepal suggests that capitalism is indeed present, but is far
from achieving dominance at either a national scale or in localities, with limited capitalist
differentiation or commercialisation of small-scale producers. Agriculture remains domi-
nated by either small-scale owner cultivation or feudal landlord-tenant relations (Bhattarai
2003; Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2001; Sugden 2009b).
Understanding Feudalism
Past studies associated with the mode of production debate have explored the persistence
of feudal relations of production in South Asia and are of particular interest in under-
standing the Nepali situation (Bhaduri 1973, 1986; Bharadwaj 1985; Sau 1990). They
offer valuable insights into the barriers to capitalist expansion in some contexts.
Unfortunately, although the “feudal” character of the past and present Nepali state and
rural economic formation is readily acknowledged by scholars and activists, there is rarely
any concrete definition of the term. The characteristics of feudalism as alluded to by Marx
(1932) when discussing the European context,1 include first, control over the means of
production by a small land-owning class with political and ideological as well as
economic power over a peasant majority. A second attribute includes the appropriation
of surplus (usually in kind) through extra-economic means, backed up by the political
power of landlords. R. S. Sharma’s (1985) definition of feudalism in the historical Indian
context refers to a similar agrarian system whereby the peasantry is subjugated to over-
lords that use their extra-economic power to extract surplus and maintain control over
landed property. A third characteristic of feudalism, which will also be incorporated into
this paper, is the use of surplus for consumption rather than productive reinvestment.
Marx (1932) asserts that the feudal lord consumes the product of the land rather than
investing it as capital to maximise productivity. Even if the surplus is sold, generating
“value,” it is used for the “superfluous product” or “luxury consumption,” as Marx notes
in Grundrisse (1973, 469). The above three characteristics form the broad definition of
feudalism that will be used throughout this paper. Although such processes can also be
present under capitalist economies in some instances, under feudalism they arguably
represent the predominant form of production and consumption.
Some of the scholarship from the mode of production debate demonstrated how feudal
relations have remained important in the post-colonial South Asian context, whereby
landlords maintain control over large estates cultivated by sharecropping tenants, imped-
ing capitalist expansion (Thorner 1982; Bharadwaj 1985). For some of the literature, the
coercive appropriation of surplus remains significant, although rather than occurring


























as indebtedness, which bond tenants not only to money-lending landlords, but to mer-
chants, often through “distress” commercialisation (Bhaduri 1973). The inclusion of
market forces is one reason why these modes of production are referred to as “semi-
feudal” rather than simply “feudal.”2 In these contexts, however, the unproductive “drain”
of surplus by landowners and merchants to meet the needs of simple reproduction only,
and the pauperisation of the poorer strata of the peasantry, block the development of the
productive forces. This constrains the emergence of profitable commodity production
from which capitalist development could potentially emerge (Bhaduri 1973, 1981).
Understanding Pre-capitalist Reproduction: Overdetermination and the Articulation
of Modes of Production
The early studies on pre-capitalist formations associated with the mode of production debate
represent valuable contributions to the literature on feudalism and constrained capitalist
development. However, there is a need for a deeper understanding of the complexity of
feudal formations. While the contradiction between the relations and forces of production is
significant in understanding feudal reproduction, how does one understand why this
formation remains entrenched in some regions of South Asia but less so in others? A
shift in the theoretical lens is necessary if one is to fully understand why feudal – and other
pre-capitalist – formations can persist and reproduce under specific geographical and
historical circumstances, even in the context of dynamic capitalist expansion.
It is useful to outline a broad theoretical framework which can be mobilised to better
address these issues in the context of Nepal. Althusser pioneered the school of Structural
Marxism which sought to reformulate Marxian political economy to counter critiques of
economism and essentialism (Resch 1992). Central to the Althusserian approach is the
concept of overdetermination. This refers to the complex means through which the
multiple processes or “contradictions” in the social whole are constituted by each other.
Althusser (1969, 106) stresses that the conditions of existence of any given contradiction
(such as the contradiction between labour and capital) can be understood only with
reference to its relation to the multiple forms of the superstructure (e.g. the state,
ideology), and its embeddedness within specific local historical contexts on the one
hand (e.g. local traditions, patterns of class struggle, trajectories of internal economic
change) and within a particular “world context” on the other (in particular relations of
domination and subordination between nations).
The concept of overdetermination is central to understanding the character of particular
modes of production. To Althusser and Balibar (1968, 215) the mode of production is
constituted by three functional elements: the means of production, the labourer or
producer, and the appropriator of surplus labour. These three elements are structured by
two “connections.” This includes first, the relation between the labourer and the means of
production, or the forces of production, and secondly, the relations of production – the
property relation which defines how the surplus is appropriated and how it is put to use. It
is the specific combination of these “elements” and “connections” at a given conjuncture
which determine the historical specificity of a mode of production (212–216). However, if
one accepts the concept of overdetermination, further theoretical clarifications are neces-
sary if one is to understand the conditions of existence of a particular mode of production
such as capitalism or feudalism and their relation with each other.

























First, the transformation and reproduction of particular modes of production cannot be
grasped without extending the analysis beyond the economic “level” to that of the
political and ideological. These processes, which form part of the superstructure, are
integral components of each mode of production and can have their own effectivity
(Althusser and Balibar 1968, 216–224). In particular, this includes the influence of diverse
state formations (Althusser 1971). Bois (1978), for example, demonstrates how feudalism
in England differed from France due to complex spatial considerations associated with
unique internal contradictions and the character of the medieval state in each region.
Secondly, as already mentioned, modes of production never exist in isolation, but co-
exist and articulate with others at specific historical junctures. This is significant when
understanding how older formations relate with an expanding capitalism. Althusser
refers to a broader entity than the mode of production, the social formation. This is
understood as a “totality” under which several co-existing modes of production are
articulated in a functional unity. It is asserted that one mode of production is normally
“dominant,” although this can be either capitalist or pre-capitalist (Althusser and Balibar
1968, 212–215).
Capitalism is a unique mode of production, in that it has a global reach. Bettelheim
(1972, 265) usefully conceptualises a broader “world wide capitalist mode of production,”
within which all social formations are subsumed in a hierarchy of “national” economies.
Crucially, however, the influence of capitalism in each social formation is variable. Rather
than pre-capitalist modes of production being “passive,” they are dynamic in their own
way, like capitalism itself, and are prone to internal contradiction and transformation.
These internal dynamics give them the capacity to articulate with capitalism, but resist
complete subordination in certain contexts.
This articulation of modes of production was demonstrated in some of the radical
anthropological studies of Africa of the 1970s and 1980s (Dupré and Rey 1979;
Meillassoux 1973, 1980; van der Klei 1985) and, more recently, in India by Singh
(2007). The diversity of pre-capitalist economic formations mean there is considerable
variation in the trajectories of change which arise from contact with the market (van
Geschiere and Raatgever 1985). Rey, for example, demonstrated how although African
“lineage” modes of production were loosely articulated with capitalism through the
exchange of commodities, they resisted further subordination at the stage of production
through complex internal mechanisms of exchange between the youth and elders which
impeded accumulation. It was only the coercive power of colonialism which was able to
break the lineage mechanisms of reproduction by implanting capitalist relations of
production, using primarily political mechanisms, such as taxation and the monetisation
of the economy (see Dupré and Rey 1979; Resch 1992).
In a similar vein, just as political processes are used to “break” the autonomy of pre-
capitalist modes of production, colonialism and imperialism have over the centuries
played a significant role in directly reinforcing pre-capitalist systems through building
political alliances with pre-capitalist ruling classes. This form of articulation has been well
documented for India (Ghosh 1988; Alavi 1975) and Vietnam (Wiegersma 1982),
whereby landlords played a role in the colonial revenue appropriation machinery or
were supported by the state for the political patronage they offered, allowing feudal
surplus to be shared by both capitalist and pre-capitalist classes.
From the discussion above, it is clear that the historically specific means through which


























realities. The intersection of unique economic, political and ideological processes, not to
mention the diverse geological and ecological contexts of particular locales, influence
both the reproduction and transformation of particular modes of production, and their
relation with others. This echoes Bois (1978), who makes the crucial point that the
evolution of modes of production does not follow a pre-determined logic identifiable at
the level of theoretical abstraction. Instead, the underlying dynamics of social transforma-
tion can be uncovered only through the historical analysis of empirical data for geogra-
phical and historically specific conjunctures. This is perhaps the most crucial
epistemological break of the Althusserian tradition. Its goal is to identify historical
individualities of given social formations rather than attempting to fit what is observed
into a pre-ordained evolutionary framework which could be driven, on the one hand, by a
vision of an all-powerful, all-encompassing capitalism; or, on the other, by an abstract
economic model of feudalism.
This paper argues that that the perpetuation of pre-capitalist economic formations in
Nepal’s far eastern Tarai, can be understood only through historical analysis of concrete
social relations. The social formation of this part of the sub-Himalayan lowlands is thus
conceptualized as constituting a unique series of interrelated and historically determined
processes – political, cultural and economic – the expansion, contraction and transforma-
tion of which have had a lasting impact on the dominant mode of production, and its
interaction with capitalism.
The Research Site
The plains of Nepal, known as the Tarai or Madhesh, are a unique and little studied region
on the frontier between the Gangetic plain and the Himalayan foothills (Figure 1). The
Tarai represents an ideal case study to understand the reproduction of older pre-capitalist
economic formations. The pre-capitalist “semi-feudal” character of agrarian relations in
the Tarai has been long acknowledged (Bhattarai 2003; Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon
2001). However, it is a region that possesses at least the physical infrastructure for
capitalist development; namely transport linkages and proximity to the expanding urban
markets of the north Indian plains. It is also home to much of Nepal’s limited industrial
development. Given the considerable diversity as one travels from west to east across this
tract, this paper focuses primarily on the region east of the Koshi River, encompassing the
present-day districts of Sunsari, Morang and Jhapa – what will be termed the “far eastern
Tarai.” This region, historically known as the Morang (or Morung) Tarai, is geographi-
cally separated from the rest of the Tarai by the Koshi river and the three districts have a
similar history and cultural composition.
Methods
This paper draws from multiple sources. The initial research was based upon one-year’s
fieldwork in central Morang district in 2007–08, with short follow-up visits in 2009 and
2011. While residing in Jhorahat Village Development Committee (VDC), an extensive
quantitative survey was carried out in four wards of Jhorahat, and a further two wards
each in neighbouring Bhaudaha and Thalaha VDCs (Figure 1).3 This was combined with
a series of in-depth interviews and oral histories collected locally.4 To gain a broader
regional perspective, historical records and studies from across the region were compiled,

























including the extensive archives compiled by Mahesh Chandra Regmi. Qualitative com-
parative data were also collected in five other VDCs across Morang and Jhapa districts,
and interviews were carried out with government officials at the district level.
Tracing the Trajectory of Change on the Far Eastern Tarai
Adivasi mode of production. In order to understand the present-day social formation and
the uneven impact of capitalist expansion at a local and global scale, it is necessary to
trace its historical evolution. The alluvial plains at the foot of the present-day Nepal,
Sikkim and Bhutan Himalayas historically represented a forested frontier belt at the edge
of the Gangetic heartland, and there are unfortunately few historical records from this
region prior to the late 1700s. Although at the fringes of Mughal influence, they fell under
the influence of numerous smaller kingdoms over the centuries (Sugden 2009a). One of
the earliest states about which there are records in the far eastern Tarai was that of
Vijayapur in the sixteenth century, which some suggest was associated with the powerful
Koch (Rajbanshi) state of Kamatapur centred on present-day Cooch Behar (Nath 1989).
Vijayapur was eventually taken over by a succession of competing kingdoms ruled by the
Hindu Sen kings in conjunction with Kirat chieftains in the hills (Acharya 1973). The
boundary between the Sen and Koch kingdom, although normally at the Mahananda River
near the present-day border, remained in flux (Nath 1989; Toulmin 2007).
Despite this expansion and contraction of loose state formations, this is unlikely to have
had a significant impact upon the population of the region, which was sparse, and
composed primarily of adivasi (indigenous) groups, such as the Tharu, Rajbanshi and
Gangai, who lived across the forested lowlands between the Koshi and Tista rivers
(Hamilton [1818] 2007). It is extremely difficult to reconstruct the historical “mode of
production” in earlier periods due to the lack of written records. However, colonial
accounts by Hamilton ([1818] 2007) in the early nineteenth century (shortly after the
Gorkhali victory), reported that the indigenous peoples of the region east of the Koshi
carried out a form of slash and burn agriculture and hoe cultivation.5 The uncultivated
forest lands were extensive and it is likely that the means of production was common
property rather than being owned by individual households or clans. Modes of production
in adivasi communities elsewhere in the sub-continent are known to have redistributive
characteristics, driven by the survival and reproduction of the clan rather than


























accumulation of wealth (see Singh 2007).6 The present-day relics and recent memories of
co-operative institutions in the far eastern Tarai, such as collective labour regimes (rare
today) and the presence of clan- and village-based ritual activity, suggest that a similar
egalitarian economic formation may have once been present. In the winter months,
livestock was brought in from Indian provinces, such as Purnea, to graze on the compar-
ably rich forest lands (Regmi 1969), perhaps representing an early articulation with
feudalism to the south.
1700s-1850s: Feudal subordination of indigenous communities. Towards the late med-
ieval period there is evidence of adivasi modes of production being gradually transformed
through the extra-economic influence of early state formations, a process also mapped out
in an earlier paper (see Sugden 2009a). The degree to which early states had an influence
over these forest-dwelling communities and their indigenous forms of economic and
political organisation is not clear, although the Sen state reportedly had some tax appro-
priation capabilities (Regmi 1970; Acharya 1973). What is evident, however, is that the
feudal empire which succeeded that of the Sen kings appeared to have had a bureaucracy
and revenue-generating machinery which surpassed earlier state formations (Regmi
1977b). In 1774, the far eastern Tarai was conquered by the Gorkhali dynasty of Prithvi
Narayan Shah, the ancestors of Nepal’s recently deposed royal family (Acharya 1973).
The Tarai was subsequently incorporated into the new kingdom of Nepal with its capital
in Kathmandu. It was the policies of this centralised state, in particular to expand its
power and appropriate surplus from its newly annexed territories, which were instrumen-
tal in subordinating the older social formation of the Tarai to feudalism.
The direct appropriation of surplus by the bureaucracy represented one of the first
interventions which set in motion the process of feudal subordination (Sugden 2009a). As
in other kingdoms of the region, the state was the ultimate landowner and had more power
than the local indigenous nobility. The acclaimed economic historian of Nepal, Mahesh
Chandra Regmi, had termed this mode of production “state landlordism” (Regmi 1977b).
Nevertheless, I will continue to refer to this economic formation as a form of feudalism.
Sharma (1985, 21), with reference to early medieval India, makes the point that even
when producers experience a “double servility” to the state and local-level landlords, this
is just one amongst many mechanisms through which the peasantry are subjugated under
feudalism. In line with the definition of feudalism given earlier in this paper, the Gorkhali
regime sought to impose a mode of production grounded in control over land by a
minority class and the appropriation of surplus through extra-economic means, facilitated
by a powerful local administrative apparatus.
The indigenous cultivators of the Tarai were obliged to surrender a significant portion
of their crop directly to the state, while also contributing labour service in construction
and defence (Regmi 1977b, 1978, 1988). These multiple forms of surplus appropriation
are likely to have impeded accumulation and technological development within the rural
population, not to mention older forms of surplus redistribution within communities. As in
the definition of feudalism above, surplus was used extensively for elite consumption.7
However, surplus was also diverted for military uses,8 a necessary expenditure if the
regime was to both maintain political control over its newly acquired territories (and by
implication its capacity to extract surplus) and continue its expansion.
A second crucial process of feudal subordination involved the creation of an indigenous
functionary class. The top level posts, such as the subba or district administrator, were

























taken by powerful members of the Gorkha elite, and indeed a brother of Prithvi Narayan
Shah himself was appointed as administrator of the Tarai districts of Bara, Parsa and
Rautahat in 1786 (Regmi 1971). However, across the Tarai, wealthier families from within
the indigenous ethnic communities were given the lower level administrative positions,
primarily in revenue collection and accounting (see Guneratne 2002). A chaudhari, often
from within the predominant Tharu community (or Rajbanshi in the far east), was placed
in charge of each revenue collection division to extract a portion of the crop from fellow
indigenous cultivators as tax, with a number of lower level indigenous functionaries
operating at the level of each locality (Regmi 1988). Functionaries were granted salaries
and land assignments for their services (Regmi 1970, 1971). Oral histories from Morang
recall how functionaries developed into an indigenous landlord class, many with large
taxable personal lands which could be sub-let to their poorer counterparts. With the
extraction of rent by landlords as well as tax by the state, there was an effective division
of the surplus product between the state and the local landlord (Sugden 2009a).
The third intervention which was central to feudal subordination was the effort by the
regime to expand the cultivable area and encourage settlement. This would have been
instrumental in interrupting the traditional pattern of nomadic shifting cultivation, and
extending the reach of feudalism from more populated regions into the remote forested
belt. To increase state revenue, chaudharis in the Tarai were encouraged to clear tracts of
forest and distribute land to tenants, who would go on to pay tribute (Regmi 1977b). At
the same time, large grants of forest land began to be distributed to members of the hill
bureaucratic elites under a tax-free tenure known as birta (Regmi 1977b, 1989).
Recipients brought in tenants from more settled tracts to clear the forest, and maintained
de facto property rights to their estates. The birta landlords continued to reside in the hills,
extracting rent through local functionaries.
These three processes consolidated the dominance of a feudal mode of production in
the far eastern Tarai where land was controlled by both the state and local landlords, with
surplus being divided between the Kathmandu bureaucracy and ruling families on the one
hand, and the local nobility on the other. At its base was an emerging class of increasingly
sedentary indigenous tenants.
Following internal power struggles within the ruling class, the Rana dynasty took
control of Nepal in 1846. Although the mechanism of surplus appropriation remained
the same, there was a restructuring of the revenue-generation apparatus. A new position
was introduced, known as the jimidar, with both administrative and tax collection
responsibilities (Regmi 1978). Although many of the original chaudharis and wealthier
indigenous cultivators also took up new positions, such as that of the jimidar and its
subordinates, they were also joined by upper castes both from India and from the hills
(Guneratne 2002; Regmi 1977b, 1988).
There was great pressure on the jimidars to expand the cultivable area and open new
forest estates, expanding the demographic composition of the tenant class. Tenants were
drawn not only from the existing indigenous population but from the caste Hindu
population of Bihar and the adivasi population of the Santhal Parganna in central India
(see Sugden 2010). The contraction of the forest frontier maximised agrarian tax revenue,
and even where forest land remained intact, as in parts of Jhapa, cultivators were taxed to
raise livestock (Shrestha 1976). Functionaries, meanwhile, were not only offered taxable
jirayat lands as a form of salary, they were able to increase their control over the means of


























Despite the important role played by the indigenous nobility as functionaries at the
local level, the Ranas retained the ultimate control over land, and the largest landlords
were powerful members of the bureaucracy, mostly from the Brahmin and Chettri castes
of the hills. The state continued to distribute birta grants to individuals close to the ruling
class to maintain their loyalty to the regime, and such estates would go on to represent
36% of Nepal’s farm land by 1952 (Adhikari 2011). The authority of the Ranas and their
inner circle to rule and appropriate surplus was legitimised further by the institutionalisa-
tion of the caste system. The 1854 Muluki Ain or civil code, sought to institutionalise the
relations between Nepal’s diverse communities at a state level (Höfer 1979; Satyal Pravat
2011). Indigenous communities, such as the Tharu, who were never part of the classical
varna hierarchy, were given an intermediate position well below the Brahmin and Chettri
who dominated the bureaucracy (Höfer 1979).
1850s-1950s: The onset of imperialism and internal feudal transformation. By the
second half of the nineteenth century, the far eastern Tarai was dominated by a feudal
mode of production whereby much of the peasantry was subjugated to dual surplus
appropriation by the state and landlords. However, it is during this period that capitalist
formations first emerged across the sub-Himalayan lowlands in neighbouring India. While
Purnea to the south had been under colonial control for several decades, to the west the
Darjeeling Tarai and Western Dooars (skirting the Sikkim and Bhutan Himalaya) fell to
the British in 1850 and 1846, respectively. This region had been subject to a similar feudal
regime under the Sikkimese and Bhutanese states (Ray 2002). While the existing feudal
social structure was maintained to facilitate administration, the British were quick to see
the economic potential of the sub-Himalayan plains for the production of cash crops and
tea. The establishment of plantations, commercial forestry and communication infrastruc-
ture thus facilitated the development of a capitalist mode of production. This operated
alongside the older economic formation which, in turn, provided it with a supply of
subsidised labour (Ray 2002; Chaudhuri 1995; Sugden 2010).
In the Nepal Tarai to the west, however, a more complex relationship with capitalism
was emerging at the turn of the century. While the region was by no means unaffected by
the expanding colonial social formation to the east, imperialism did not seek direct
articulations with the Tarai’s older modes of production through labour relations, as was
occurring in the plantation economy of India (Sugden 2010). Nepal initially offered the
colonialists not labour, but a source of raw materials and untapped market for manufac-
tured commodities, including both luxuries for the ruling class and daily consumption
goods (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2001). In this context it actually served their
interests to maintain Nepal’s formal territorial sovereignty. An alliance developed with
the Ranas, whereby the British guaranteed Nepal’s formal independence so long as they
opened their borders to imports and allowed them access to resources such as timber
(Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2001). The British had also been impressed with the
abilities of Nepal’s soldiers during its earlier wars with the kingdom, and thus sought the
continued recruitment of Nepalese troops to the British army (Caplan 1995).
The Rana-British alliance provided the colonialists with raw materials, troops and a
captive market and raw materials,9 while saving them the costs and risks of administra-
tion. In geopolitical terms it ensured the presence of a loyal regime between British India
and Tibet (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2001). The Ranas on the other hand, were able
to appropriate a share of the surplus obtained by colonialism. In collaboration with a

























growing, largely mercantile, comprador bourgeoisie (as opposed to a national bourgeoisie)
they were enriched not only by agrarian revenue, but now also from taxes on imported
British consumer goods as well as the exports of raw materials (Bhattarai 2003; Blaikie,
Cameron, and Seddon 2001, 2002). The vast sums of revenue collected by the regime was
used to strengthen the state apparatus and to further fund luxury consumption (Blaikie,
Cameron, and Seddon 2001).
The development of rail heads on the southern border from 1895 to 1898 was instru-
mental in further entrenching this unequal relationship. It maximized outflows of raw
materials, while imported commodities served to impede the development of domestic
industry in the Tarai or indeed anywhere else in Nepal (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon
2001). The once-burgeoning cottage industry sector, including textiles, metal ware, wood-
work and mineral extraction, was undermined (Regmi 1977a). On the ground in the far
eastern Tarai, the comprador-colonial alliance arguably intensified feudalism. It impeded
the emergence of alternative livelihood options for a pauperised peasantry, while on a
political level it strengthened the wealth and power of the class with primary control over
land, the Ranas. What is evident in this context is that the external dominance of
capitalism actually reinforced and shaped the internal dominance of Nepal’s pre-capitalist
economy.10 This has occurred, however, through political alliances between a feudal
comprador class and a burgeoning colonial power.
This did not, however, prevent the occurrence of internal transformations within the
feudal economy. Given that imperialism offered new sources of revenue, land tax from the
peasantry was gradually declining in importance for the state. By the early twentieth
century, the regime had introduced a number of interventions in the context of expanding
market relations. However, rather than undermining the feudal mode of production, it
simply led to a shift in its character (Sugden 2009a). The first intervention was the
development of property rights for raikar land, allowing cultivators to buy or sell their
state-owned holdings so long as tax was still paid (Regmi 1977b). The second interven-
tion was the monetisation of land tax. As the monetised tax rates remained static, despite
rapidly rising commodity prices in the period, the raikar landowner needed a smaller
amount of grain to meet tax obligations. This made it more desirable for landlords to rent
out excess holdings, because after paying tribute to the state, rents could be increased
while still allowing tenants to meet their minimum subsistence needs (Regmi 1977b).
These two processes encouraged jimidars to further expand their holdings while also
providing an incentive for other individuals with capital to buy land, worsening the
concentration in landownership. At the same time, the state continued to encourage the
clearing of the remaining forest land by large farmers of hill origin, creating completely
new landed estates. A notification from 1923 in the government mouthpiece Gorkhapatra
called hill people who had migrated to India to return and clear forest land set aside for the
purpose in Morang district. Incentives were given in particular for farmers with capital to
clear large estates, whereby they would be given large personal holdings as reward, and
would be appointed jimidar in the case of estates over 100 bigha (approximately 67.7 ha)
(Government of Nepal [1923] 1974). Zamindars from India were also encouraged to
establish estates (Gaige 1976).
It is worth noting that falling land tax rates and the emergence of property rights also
meant that those with their own plots of land were now emerging as an independent
cultivator class who could retain much of their surplus. This can be considered an


























plots which emerged through internal feudal transformation. However, this group was
small in number and growing indebtedness to money lenders following the monetisation
of tax (and the wider economy), resulted in many peasant landowners falling back into the
grasp of feudalism as they lost their property to the traditional landed classes and became
tenants. Elders in the study communities noted how jimidars themselves used to appro-
priate land from those unable to meet tax or debt repayment obligations. It is likely that
the destruction of domestic industry and accompanying demand for cash would have
intensified this process. Regmi (1977b, 118) estimates that while some jimidars in
Morang district owned up to 22,000 bigha as of 1948, 23% of cultivating households
owned less than one bigha each.
There was some limited capitalist development in the 1930s with the establishment of
some early industries in Biratnagar in a joint comprador alliance between the Ranas and
Indian capital (Karan and Ishil 1996). However, the enterprises, which included jute and
sugar processing, remained speculative in character, employment was scarce, and profits
were often repatriated to India (Regmi 1977a). In sum, the devaluation of tax, monetisa-
tion, and the rising concentration in landed property which accompanied it consolidated
ground rent to landlords as the primary form of surplus appropriation. This was backed up
by the power of the state, and is the origin of the predominant form of landlordism in
today’s Tarai.
1950s-2000s: The rise of absentee landlordism and industrialisation. In 1951, the Ranas
were overthrown by the Shah monarchy, the descendants of the early Gorkha dynasty.
Following a brief experiment with parliamentary democracy, King Mahendra seized
absolute power and introduced the partyless Panchayat System. The new regime com-
bined authoritarian rule with an exclusionary nationalism grounded in the identity of the
dominant Nepali-speaking castes of the hills (Gaige 1976). As the rulers sought legiti-
macy they toyed with discourses of “rural development” and attempts were made at land
reform, culminating in the 1964 Lands Act. The reforms abolished the jimidari system,
which by this stage had declined in significance as landlordism became the primary
mechanism of surplus appropriation. The Act also abolished birta tenure while setting
the maximum ceiling for land at 25 bigha for the Tarai (Regmi 1977b).
However, as was outlined above, birta grants and the jimidari system had incorporated
the feudal landlords within a state bureaucratic alliance. This remained the same, despite
the changed leadership (Mishra 2007). Given that landlords remained support bases of the
king it was inevitable that reforms would do little to end the concentration of landed
property and undermine feudalism. Political leaders continued to use the rhetoric of land
reform to gain support while simultaneously striving to retain ownership of their personal
estates (Adhikari 2011). Regmi (1977b) notes that by 1972, only 22,000 hectares of land
were actually redistributed, benefiting only 10,000 households.
On the ground in the Tarai, landlords could not only benefit from a government with
little commitment to change, but could consciously avoid the reforms when attempts were
made at a local level to implement land ceilings. In Morang, elders recalled how many
landlords registered themselves as cultivators, while renting out the land to tenants
unofficially, a process also described by Regmi (1977b). Some were able to retain their
estates by dividing up land amongst family members to avoid exceeding the government
ceilings (in one case a couple reportedly divorced to spread their property). Birta

























recipients pursued similar avoidance measures but only after converting it to taxable
raikar tenure (Adhikari 2011).
However, it is worth noting that in the case study communities of Morang, that the hill
origin Brahmin and Chettri landlords were more successful in retaining their control over
landed property than the indigenous elites (Sugden 2009a). It was recalled by elders that
the indigenous Tharu nobility did not have the same links to the bureaucracy as their high
caste counterparts, and were therefore the primary losers from the reforms.11 It is in this
context one can observe the crucial political mechanisms through which feudalism is both
reproduced but also undergoes internal transformation. The indigenous landlords had
served their purpose as intermediaries under a more centralised form of feudalism.
Their weaker political power (and position outside the dominant Nepali-speaking high
caste community) made it more difficult for them to bypass land reform legislation and
maintain their power as a landlord class. Indigenous landlords reportedly also lost land
following the greater penetration of merchant capital into the lowlands, with rising
indebtedness, a process also affecting smaller owner-cultivators.
These internal feudal transformations in the second half of the twentieth century meant
that the indigenous landowning class had declined significantly in some communities. The
powerful class of former jimidars and birta owners (many of whom had other forms of
employment), retained their power but were increasingly settling in developing urban
centres, from where they continued to extract rent as an absentee landowning class.
Surplus extracted by landlords was generally put towards consumption of imported
luxuries and speculative investment (Adhikari 2011). Locally based landlords did retain
their power in some parts of the far eastern Tarai although these included both Maithili-
speaking castes as well as indigenous communities.
Although the relations of production were still “feudal” on lands controlled by the
absentee landlords, this class had become increasingly diverse, and increasingly
encompassed urban professionals buying up land as well as the traditional landed
elite. Although the draft land reform legislation in the 1960s originally set rent at one-
third of the crop, this was changed later to half of the crop to favour landed interest
groups (Adhikari 2011). This not only legally sanctioned feudal relations, but ensured
that land remained a profitable investment in the short term. On the other hand there
were only limited opportunities for (often indebted) landless tenants to buy land. In
fact, reactionary citizenship laws biased against non-Nepali-speaking Tarai commu-
nities (see Gaige 1976), also deprived many households from the citizenship papers
necessary to make purchases.
The growing diversity of the landlord class, alongside the increased influence of market
forces in the rural economy, means that it is better to term the mode of production as
“semi-feudal” rather than “feudal” from this point. In other words, although a small (albeit
diverse) class retained control over land and appropriated surplus in kind, market relations
such as debt were increasingly part of the process through which this economic formation
was reproduced. There had thus been a transformation in the second half of the twentieth
century from feudal system whereby the monopoly over land was shared between landed
indigenous households and a predominantly Brahmin and Chettri political elite, to a new
“semi-feudal” system dominated by an absentee as well as local landlord class.
While the position of independent peasant cultivators remained tenuous, this mode of
production expanded significantly in the northern tract of the far eastern Tarai from the


























colonised large tracts of forest land (Gaige 1976; Shrestha and Velu 1993). The population
of migrants in the Tarai had risen to 685,000 by 1981 (Shrestha and Velu 1993). Most of
the settlers were owner-cultivators receiving allocated plots of land, in contrast to the
imposition of feudalism during the early reclamation schemes where jimidars were invited
to clear new lands (Shrestha and Velu 1993). Interestingly, however, the encouragement of
migration from the north rather than the regions of severe landlessness in neighbouring
parts of the lowlands may well have represented a mechanism through which the state
could increase its control over the Tarai belt by expanding settlement, while retaining the
semi-feudal mode of production already entrenched to the south. It could at the same time
offset demographic pressure in the hills and limit dissent.
The introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1990s had little impact on social
relations on the ground in the regions dominated by semi-feudalism. Rather than repre-
senting the class interests of the majority, across Nepal, many political parties degenerated
into patronage networks mediating access to resources (see Pfaff-Czarnecka 2004).
Scholars have suggested there is continuity in the social relations they represent, with
landed families and comprador-merchant capitalists well represented in party leadership
(Karki 2005). Respondents in Morang reported that some of the largest, longest estab-
lished landlords included leaders from most of Nepal’s mainstream (i.e. not Maoist)
parties. There was also evidence of patron-client relationships. One respondent in
Morang noted how politically active landlords would offer menial jobs and “favours” to
tenants, often in return for support in elections.12
In the face of a rising Maoist insurgency in the early twenty-first century, land reform
inevitably appeared on the political agenda once again (Adhikari 2011). However, landed
interests in parties and the bureaucracy remained entrenched, and reforms had limited
impact (Nepali and Pyakuryal 2010; Adhikari 2011). The government consistently lacked
true commitment and policing of legislation has been limited (Adhikari 2011; Khanal,
Rajkarnikar, and Acharya 2005). This cannot be understood in terms of technocratic
institutional failures, but requires a reiteration of the importance of land to political
authority in Nepal over the last two centuries.
At a macro-scale, independence in India and democracy at home has done little to
undermine Nepal’s subordinate relationship within South Asia over the last half a century.
Political leaders in the centre have maintained semi-colonial trade relations with India in
collaboration with the comprador bourgeoisie (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2001).
There was a wave of industrial development centred on the Biratnagar-Itahari corridor
in Morang and Jhapa districts from the late 1950s onwards. However, given the weak pre-
existing industrial base, local manufacturers could not develop the productive forces to
levels sufficient to compete with the cheaper commodities being imported from India and
overseas (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2001; Regmi 1977a). Most of the industries
which were established were subordinate to Indian capital (see Gaige 1976), and most of
the profits were repatriated, impeding accumulation and the long-term domestic develop-
ment of the productive forces (Bhattarai 2003).
Today manufacturing is dominated by low value agricultural, textiles and timber-related
industries, which represent 56% of total invested assets in the far eastern Tarai in 2006–07
(Central Bureau of Statistics 2008). Aside from the dependent industrial sector, the
proximity to North Bengal had encouraged the development of tea plantations in the
eastern district of Jhapa towards the second half of the twentieth century. Field visits to
Maheshpur VDC revealed that some larger landlords had themselves developed their

























estates into plantations in recent years, although this process is restricted to a relatively
small area.
Semi-feudalism and industrial expansion: articulation of modes of production. While it
has been established how semi-feudal relations have become widespread, a crucial ques-
tion which addresses this paper’s core theme, is how industrial growth has impacted the
semi-feudal economy of the far eastern Tarai. Important insights can be gained from the
Morang case study villages which are within the sphere of influence of the Morang-
Sunsari industrial corridor.
A glance at the rural social formation suggests that a semi-feudal mode of production
remains predominant. The VDCs of Bhaudaha, Jhorahat and Thalaha lie well to the south
of the region settled by the hill peasantry, and have a long history of landlordism. There is
a large Tharu community in Jhorahat, although the power of the Tharu nobility is greatly
reduced. Alongside the Tharu there are some Brahmin and Chettri who migrated from the
hills in the second half of the twentieth century. Bhaudaha and Thalaha to the east are
today home predominantly to smaller indigenous communities, such as the Bantar,
Rajbanshi and Jhagar. In all the VDCs there are limited populations of Maithili-speaking
middle castes who are often involved in trade, and small settlements of Tarai Dalit
communities, such as the Rishidev (Musahar). Households predominantly cultivate a
single crop of monsoon dhan or paddy, which is stored during the dry months while
they cultivate a smaller harvest of wheat, mustard and pulses. Cash crops are limited to
jute, which is cultivated by a few farmers and is often for home use as well as for sale.
Table 1 shows that tenant farming is prevalent in the sampled wards of Bhaudaha and
Thalaha. Some 25% of sampled households in Bhaudaha and 20% of households in
Thalaha are “part-tenants,” both renting and owning agricultural land, while 33% of
sampled households in both communities are “pure tenants,” only renting land. An
additional 28% of households in Bhaudaha and 35% in Thalaha rely solely upon wage
labour for other households (including tenants) or in the non-farm economy. It is thus
clear that close to two-thirds of the sampled households for these two VDCs are entirely
landless. Table 2 similarly shows that 70% of the operated land by the sampled house-
holds in Bhaudaha and 77% in Thalaha is under tenancy. In the sampled wards of Jhorahat
on the other hand, owner-cultivation is more prevalent. Some 33% of households are
“independent peasants” (Table 1), and owner-cultivated land represents 49% of the area
cultivated by the sample (Table 2). This is unsurprising given the historical status of
privilege that the Tharu and Bramhin/Chettri communities (who are predominant in
Jhorahat) have held within the state apparatus on the far eastern Tarai. However, tenant
relations remain important here also, with 20% of households as part-tenants and 15% as
pure-tenants, with the remainder as landless labourers.
There are few large landlords actually residing within the selected VDCs given the
decline of Morang’s traditional Tharu landowners discussed above, although there are
larger locally based landlords in other VDCs of Morang district. Of the 6% of wealthier
households in the three VDCs who rent out land in local-level feudal relations, share-
cropped plots are on average only 1.6 ha. They are not, therefore, a significant landlord
class. In fact, a substantial 73% of the land in the total sample is operated by urban-based
landlords in Kathmandu and Biratnagar. This includes members of the traditional landed


























The most striking observation is the limited accumulation of surplus within the
peasantry. Athreya and colleagues (1987, 159) clarifies the definition of “surplus” for a
peasant household as “what is available for luxury consumption or for accumulation, once
the requirements of simple reproduction have been met.” The requirements of simple
reproduction include the reproduction of labour power through provision of food, and the
reproduction of the means of production necessary to produce these subsistence goods..13
Therefore, in a peasant household, the aggregate household labour time in which the
needs of simple reproduction are met within a set unit of time, can be classified as their
“necessary labour time.” “Surplus labour time” thus refers to the extra hours in which a
surplus product can be produced.14
What is evident, however, is that much of the surplus is appropriated through ground
rent. After cultivating paddy, wheat, or pulses, tenants pay the landlords either 50% of
each harvest through the adhiya sharecropping system, or a fixed rate through the thekka
system. This absorbs much of the product of “surplus” labour time and, for many, a
portion of the product of “necessary” labour time. For example, a selection of respondents
were asked what they felt was the minimum annual grain requirements of a household
with a typical family of six (in the survey, 5.6). The response was invariably between 40
Table 2. Proportion of land under different tenure types within sample from Jhorahat, Bhaudaha
and Thalaha
Type of household by land tenure Jhorahat Bhaudaha Thalaha All three VDCs
Land owned and cultivated Area (ha) 43.44 16.62 10.65 70.71
% total 49 30 20 36
Land cultivated under tenancy Area (ha) 30.69 38.49 40.53 109.71
% total 34 70 77 55
Land rented to others Area (ha) 15.11 0.67 1.34 17.2
% total 20 1 3 9
Source: Survey by author.
Table 1. Landownership and form of cultivation in sample from Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and
Thalaha VDCs
Type of household by land tenure Jhorahat Bhaudaha Thalaha All three VDCs
Owner-cultivation only (“independent % 33 14 10 21
peasant”) n 27 6 5 38
Owner-cultivation and tenancy (“part-tenant”) % 20 25 20 21
n 16 11 10 37
Tenant cultivation only (“pure-tenant”) % 15 33 33 24
n 12 14 16 42
No land operated (“landless labourer”) % 28 28 35 31
n 23 16 17 56
Renting out land only with no cultivation % 5 0 2 3
n 4 0 1 5
n, number of cases.
Source: Survey by author.

























to 45 maund (1 maund = 40 kg) of paddy and 10 to 11 maund of wheat (approximately
357 kg of grain for each family member). Only 23% of pure-tenants were able to produce
this, despite the fact that the average rented holdings of this group was 2.1 bigha, more
than double the 0.94 bigha required to produce this amount at average rates of tenant
productivity (calculated at 2,285 kg of grain per bigha). This suggests that landlords and
merchants appropriate a portion of necessary as well as surplus labour time.
Interestingly, it appears that the appropriation of surplus through extra-economic means
which was central to feudal relations of production in the Rana era is less common today
in the case study communities. There was little evidence, for example, of rents being
forced up through coercion or debt bondage. This may be due to the fact that the
predominant absentee landlords rarely visit their estates, and rent is often appropriated
through a locally based agent or kamtiya. Coercive surplus appropriation, however, has
been observed in the forms of attached labour in other VDCs of Morang where there are
more large locally based landlords (Hatlebakk 2004). The lack of “coercion” does not
mean that feudal relations are declining in the case study communities. This was only one
element of feudalism outlined at the start of the paper, and land still remains concentrated
in the hands of a politically powerful landlord class. With or without coercion, the severe
levels of landlessness ensure competition for tenancies remain high and there appear to be
few incentives for the absentee landlords to lower rents.15
Aside from rent, households are subject to further surplus appropriation by merchant
capital in value form through price manipulation on sales and interest on loans. Most
farmers borrow money from private lenders, such as local business people, their landlords
or (more commonly) as advance purchases by the grain merchants, or katawalas, whereby
they repay the loan in kind at harvest time with interest. Table 3 shows that pure-tenant
and part-tenant farmers on the whole are most dependent on such loans, having borrowed
on average Rs8,125 and Rs10,216 from private lenders over the last year, as opposed to
the Rs1,933 borrowed by independent peasants. Such households are also more dependent
upon the smaller loans taken from microfinance banks (Table 3).
Interest by private lenders varies from 3-5% per month until the loan is repaid in cash
or in grain, usually after the harvest. The rate often depends upon the wealth and resultant
bargaining power of the household, with poorer producers or those in urgent need of cash
being reportedly charged the most.16 Merchants, most of whom are from the Baniya and
Marwari business communities, are rarely large-scale landowners, so there is limited
inter-linkage of landlord and merchant capital, as described in Bhaduri’s (1973) classic
study of semi-feudalism.17 Nevertheless, both forms of surplus extraction are intricately
connected with the economic insecurity which in the first instance is derived from the
Table 3. Average size of loans taken by households under different tenure regimes over last year
Type of household by land
tenure
Average loan borrowed from
private lenders (Rs)
Average loan borrowed from
microfinance banks
Independent peasant 1,933 2,786
Part-tenant 10,216 6,027
Pure-tenant 8,152 1,052
Landless labourer 98 4,383


























relations of production. Semi-feudal rent reduces incomes and increases the demand for
credit, driving farmers to merchants for loans. At the same time, economic insecurity and
debt decreases producer’s bargaining power, driving them to accept high interest rates and
low commodity prices.
Many households in this context are in cycles of debt, as in the past, culminating in the
gradual distress sale of what land remains under owner cultivation. Over the last decade
from the time of the survey, Figure 2 shows that significantly more land has been sold
than has been bought. Part-tenant households appear to be in a particularly precarious
situation and, as a group have sold 5.23 ha, while having purchased only 2.32 ha,
suggesting the amount of land under tenancy is increasing. Even the independent peasants
have collectively sold more land than has been bought. In fact, the average area of land
sold to absentee landlords by sampled households over the last decade was found to be
0.5 ha, as compared to 0.34 ha sold to local owner-cultivators. The concentration of land
resources in the hand of an absentee landed class arguably limits the extent to which
holdings can be expanded, even for the independent peasants who one would expect could
display “accumulation” tendencies.
The “drain” of surplus by landowners and merchants and the pauperisation of the
poorer strata of the peasantry block the development of the productive forces and
reproduce the semi-feudal mode of production. There is limited investment in inputs
aside from fertiliser, and only 23% of pure-tenant and part-tenant households in the
sample have been able to raise the capital to irrigate their lands to produce a second
Figure 2. Aggregate land bought and sold by sampled households over the last ten years (ha).
Source: survey by author.

























rice crop. Technologies, such as threshers, are present, but these are mostly rented from a
few wealthier farmers for a portion of the crop and thus, for the majority, act as a
convenience more than a source of accumulation.
Absentee landlords played a very limited role in encouraging innovation or develop-
ment of the productive forces. For 23% of sampled tenants (including part-tenants) the
landlord had not visited at all over the last year and a local agent or kamtiya ensures rent is
paid, while 54% tenants reported that their landlord had visited only once or twice, mostly
with the sole purpose of collecting the rent. Only 45% of tenants had ever received
guidance from their landlords, such as advice on inputs or crops.
A remaining question to ascertain the “semi-feudal” character of landlordism is how
surplus by landlords is used, or whether it “reappears” elsewhere in the economy in
“capitalist” enterprises. It is difficult to ascertain how each individual landlord invests
their surplus and this represents an avenue for further research. Nevertheless, if rent was
collected for profit-maximising purposes one would expect efforts by landlords to develop
the productive forces and encourage investment. Furthermore, initial testimonials from
farmers and officials suggest that rent is mainly used by landlords for consumption,
supplementing their (already high) incomes which derive from the service sector and
positions in the bureaucracy, long the domain of landed households. Furthermore, a large
number of “capitalist” enterprises, such as factories, are run by Marwaris who in this
region were reportedly not significant landlords.
The role of industry. In the case study villages, it is clear that in the context of high rent,
usury and low yields, tenant agriculture is insufficient to support a family, particularly
when households have cash needs on top of their nutritional requirements. Employment in
the non-farm economy on the other hand, offers a supply of cash, although as with
tenancy, the unskilled non-farm wages are insufficient to support a family and, at the time
of research, were on average just Rs125 (US$1.70) per day. Furthermore, given the
underdeveloped character of the capitalist sector, work is insecure and difficult to find.
In this context, they intensify the use of their family labour, completing a portion of their
“necessary” labour both on and off their land, with the entire surplus being appropriated
through rent, interest on loans and off-farm wages.
Out of the sample, 26% of tenant households (including part-tenants) farm while
also working in manufacturing industries, thus rotating between the capitalist and
semi-feudal modes of production. Another 35% have not been able to secure factory
employment, which is in high demand, and instead seek work on a more casual basis
in Biratnagar town, as rickshaw or hand-cart pullers or as labourers in the burgeoning
construction sector. Although not directly capitalist, Biratnagar’s industries and the
comprador import-export sector would not be able to function without this supporting
labour, not to mention the bureaucracy through which the entire social formation is
reproduced.
While it is evident that there is an articulation of modes of production, what are the
structures of dominance in this social formation? It appears that the presence of industry
by no means has the potential to undermine semi-feudalism by causing a “pull” out of
agriculture. In fact, the two modes of production supplement each other. First, control
over land by an absentee landlord elite constrains farmers from meeting their subsistence
needs through agriculture due to rent obligations. This drives tenant farmers to simulta-


























receive wages below subsistence levels. This benefits capitalism in both the manufactur-
ing industry and the urban tertiary sector on which the former depends. Secondly, levels of
employment and wage rates remain at levels that competition for tenancies remains high
despite industrial development, favouring landlords. In this context tenants’ necessary
labour time is carried out on both the land and in the non-farm sector, while the net
surplus produced by households is “shared” between urban-based landlords and
capitalist employers (both directly in the case of industry and indirectly in the case of
casual urban labour).
A remaining question relates to the landless labouring households. Could they signify
the emergence of a class of free (or unfree) capitalist wage workers? This appears
unlikely. First, many of these labourers cannot really be separated from the tenant class.
Households move in and out of tenancies periodically, and many who are classified as
“landless labourers” are simply those who were unsuccessful in finding land to rent at the
time of research. These periods of complete separation from the land usually cause
families to intensify their labour off the farm, normally in the urban informal sector,
while pursuing other activities dependent upon common property resources, such as
fishing or livestock raising. Secondly, the proportion of landless labourers employed in
factories is only 11%, with just 28% working as casual urban labourers. In fact the
landless labourers actually participate less in the non-farm labour market than those
simultaneously engaged in tenant agriculture (61% of tenants engage in non-farm labour
as opposed to 39% landless labourers). This is probably because many of the remaining
landless labourers have very limited involvement in the capitalist sector in the first place.
They are dependent mostly upon agricultural labour, often within the pre-capitalist semi-
feudal or independent peasant mode of production, whereby wages are paid in both cash
and kind. This includes labouring for other tenants or owner-cultivating peasants who are
facing (often temporary) shortfalls of family labour, such as during the paddy transplant-
ing season, as well as working for the few locally based small landlords. They represent
the poorest group in the region with subsistence needs pushed to the physiological
minimum, and many are from the Rishidev (Musahar) community.
It is clear, therefore, that capitalist industry in the Tarai is far from undermining
landlord power. As of 2008 across the far eastern Tarai (Sunsari, Morang and Jhapa
districts), only 9% of active workers have found employment in manufacturing (Central
Bureau of Statistics 2008). A small increase in manufacturing jobs will be unlikely to
succeed in undermining the articulation with feudalism unless competition for jobs is
substantially reduced to the point that wages begin to rise and rents fall. This seems
unlikely to occur so long as industry remains dependent upon foreign (mostly Indian)
capital, and comprador interests remain entrenched in the bureaucracy. This has consis-
tently impeded the development of domestic enterprises producing higher value products,
not to mention the forward and backward linkages associated with broad-scale industrial
capitalism.
Further analysis would be necessary to identify the more complex convergences and
divergences of interests between the landlord and industrial capitalist class, although for
now it seems that a stable and mutually beneficial articulation has emerged between the
two modes of production they control. The mediating role of the state is perhaps
significant in supporting this articulation and preventing conflict, given its historical
role representing the interests of landlords, Indian expansionism and a domestic compra-
dor class.

























Migration and pre-capitalist reproduction. A final question relates to the role of over-
seas migration in undermining or reproducing the semi-feudal mode of production. In the
1990s and 2000s across Nepal, there has been a significant rise in overseas labour
migration to the Gulf and newly industrialised economies of Southeast Asia (Graner
and Gurung 2003). According to the 2003–04 National Living Standards Measurement
Survey, 18.1% of households in the rural eastern Tarai now receive remittances from
abroad (Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski, and Glinkskaya 2007). In this context, the govern-
ment has actively facilitated the remittance economy (Graner and Gurung 2003; Sugden
2010). This arguably serves to reinforce Nepal’s subordinate position in the global
economy, reinforcing a structure of economic dependence from which the comprador
class has benefited for generations, while possibly averting class struggle.
The vast majority of these migrants come from the Tarai’s hill settler population,
particularly from the prosperous regions to the north of the Tarai settled in the 1960s.18
Migration is, however, also becoming more significant in the regions where the semi-
feudal mode of production remains pre-dominant. In the case study VDCs described
above, the field survey recorded that 8% of households had at least one family member
overseas. However, migration requires capital, and thus it is primarily the better off
farmers, most of whom at least hold some land as owner-cultivators, who are receiving
remittances. These patterns of migration represent an international articulation of modes
of production whereby predominantly male labourers supply cheap labour to capitalism
abroad, while their families are supported at home by pre-capitalist agriculture.
Although articulated primarily with independent peasant farming, migration also serves
to reinforce semi-feudalism as some of the farmers who could potentially show signs of
accumulation have instead chosen to migrate, sometimes leasing out their land as tenan-
cies to poorer households. This explains the 3% of renting-out households in Table 1.
Interestingly, ethnic unrest in the Tarai over the last few years has encouraged many of the
larger landlords to sell off some of their estates in more remote regions. Recent discus-
sions in the field, however, revealed that many of these are being sold not to local landless
tenants or labourers, but to the families of migrants, who continue to rent them out,
pointing perhaps to a further shift in the dynamic of feudalism over coming years.
Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated how pre-capitalist feudal modes of production have persisted
in parts the far eastern Tarai, a process which has been mediated by the intersection of
diverse political, cultural and economic relations across the sub-Himalayan lowlands,
including those associated with capitalism itself.
Following the early subordination of indigenous communities by expanding centralised
states, feudalism in the far eastern Tarai has evolved from a system grounded in state
appropriation of surplus to a more decentred mode of production whereby individual
landlords appropriate much of the surplus. Nevertheless, the earlier social formation had
integrated landlords within the state bureaucratic alliance. These landlords, most of whom
are of high caste hill descent, were able to maintain more power than the indigenous
nobility, whose political networks were less conducive to the reproduction of their class
position. Today, therefore, politically mediated control over land has remained important
to the perpetuation of present-day feudalism, whereby “land reforms” have been avoided


























At the same time, the Tarai’s (and Nepal’s) position in the global and regional economy
has impeded the emergence of organic capitalist development which could have under-
mined feudal relations. This has emerged from a legacy of political alliances between the
Kathmandu rulers and a comprador bourgeoisie serving the interests of foreign (mostly
Indian) capital within the same bureaucracy which represents landed interests. Profits
from the far eastern Tarai’s manufacturing industries continue to be drained to investing
economies while development of the sector remains limited. In fact, the legacy of
subordination to both imperialism and feudalism manifests itself today in an articulation
of modes of production, whereby the largely landless tenant and labouring households
provide cheap semi-proletarian labour to the Tarai’s capitalist sector. The net product of
surplus labour is thus shared between landlords and the predominantly foreign-owned
industries.
This raises important lessons for the analysis of globalisation. It is clear that capitalism
is by no means an omnipotent force that will transform economies in its wake. Its
interaction with older modes of production is far more complex. Political and ideological
processes within social formations, as well as the external imperatives of capitalism itself,
can serve to reinforce the power and autonomy of older economic formations, while
selective opportunities for surplus appropriation by capital are developed without challen-
ging pre-capitalist authority.
The multiple levels at which semi-feudalism has been reproduced in the far eastern
Tarai also points to fundamental challenges to transitional Nepal and may shed some light
on the lack of social transformation, despite the political changes of the last five years.
While the king, who could be considered as a symbolic representation of feudalism has
been removed, and left parties are influential in the government, much of the old bureau-
cracy remains in place. It would thus be naïve to assume that the feudal-imperialist nexus
would have contracted in the monarchy’s wake, just as one cannot assume that capitalism
will flourish following “technocratic” development interventions. Of course, what is
required to facilitate transition to a more equitable economic formation is not “more
capitalism.” Instead, Nepal requires a much deeper structural transformation. This must be
directed by effective social mobilisation on the ground against both capitalist and pre-
capitalist class contradictions which are present at multiple geographical scales on an
economic and political level.
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Notes
1 Marx refers to these characteristics of feudalism in a number of his writings, but it is dealt with most
systematically in the discussion on “Rent of Land” from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.

























2 As Bhaduri (1981, 44) notes: “Translated into the language of daily politics in India, our schematisation of the
class structure in Indian agriculture corresponds to the coexistence of ‘feudal remnants’ (or semi-feudalism)
sustained by a nexus of forced commercial relations and ‘capitalist tendencies’.”
3 The VDC is the primary unit of local government in Nepal, comparable to the Indian panchayat.
4 For the survey, all homesteads in the selected wards were given a number on a self-made map of the
community. A random number table was used to select 20% of households, producing a total sample size of
180. Selected households were approached and the purpose of the study explained prior to beginning the
survey. One household opted out. A further 20 households (who showed an interest in the research and were
from different class and ethnic groups) were selected from the sample to participate in in-depth qualitative
interviews. Several informal focus groups were also conducted and oral histories were collected from key
informants residing locally.
5 This also parallels colonial accounts in 1911 from the Western Dooars, the eastern extension of the Nepal
Tarai in contemporary North Bengal, a region with similar ethnic and ecological characteristics (Grunning
[1911] 2007).
6 According to Singh (2007) any potential accumulation of surplus which does take place in adivasi social
formations is undermined by redistributive mechanisms. It is taxation and other coercive measures of
capitalism and/or feudalism which restructure this mode of production.
7 There are a series of interesting government directives from the far eastern Tarai in the late eighteenth century
usefully compiled by Regmi (1971). These records indicate the feudal character of the regime, with the
diversion of surplus to elite consumption within the ruling class. The Morang subba or district administrator
lists the expenditures made with agrarian revenue, including gifts for distribution within royal networks,
wedding and medical expenses for the royal family and salaries for artisans to maintain palaces. A later
directive indicates expenses such as providing hospitality for visiting “Englishmen, Nawabs and Rajas and
Wakils” (Regmi 1988, 1).
8 A set of directives from 1804–05 recorded in Regmi (1973) point to military uses of revenue. These include
the use of tax revenue from Morang to purchase steel from Kolkata for the manufacture of munitions. The
above two directives were also discussed in Sugden (2011).
9 Labour recruitments from Nepal increased in the later colonial era as workers migrated to populate the tea
plantations in Darjeeling, the Dooars and Assam, although the British did not require territorial control of
Nepal to mobilise these workers.
10 This echoes Bettelheim (1972), who suggests that the global capitalist mode of production is subject to a
“twofold tendency.” First, it reproduces the relations and forces of production at the scale of each national
social formation, including the reproduction of specific forms of domination between capitalist and non-
capitalist modes of production. Secondly, at an international scale it reproduces the unequal relations between
these social formations. The degree to which capitalism can actually achieve dominance within a given social
formation is thus mediated by these relations (Bettelheim 1972).
11 Gaige (1976) notes that across the Tarai in the 1960s, high caste hill settlers had relatively good connections
with the local and Kathmandu-based bureaucracy.
12 More examples of patron-client relationships involving political parties in Morang are documented in
Ollieuz (2011).
13 Investment in means of production entails the investment in inputs which maintain existing levels of productivity.
Under capitalism, the reproduction of the means of production is paid for out of surplus value. However, as labour
has not been separated from the means of production, investment in the inputs necessary to produce enough for the
family to subsist must be paid for with the product of necessary labour time.
14 The product of which is appropriated by the bourgeoisie in value form under capitalism (Marx 1974,
208–209).
15 The determination of households to secure tenancies is evident in the main Bantar village of Bhaudaha. It was
revealed that seven households are farming as sub-tenants. A few “enterprising” tenants have used their social
networks to rent out extra land and then sub-let it to those not fortunate enough to have the necessary
contacts, making five maund (200 kg) profit as the discussants termed it, “for no extra work.” They went on
to suggest that poor farmers were willing to take up sub-tenancies at inflated rates of rent given the high
unemployment and landlessness.
16 With this inter-linkage of merchant and usurer capital, further inflation of interest often occurs at the time of
sale, whereby the trader decreases the grain price against which repayments are calculated to below the
market rate. As farmers are obliged to repay the loan they cannot sell to a different grain trader offering a


























17 A nexus between merchants and landlords has been found to be present in other parts of the eastern Tarai in
Hatlebakk (2002). Labour-employing landlords collaborate with merchants to keep agricultural wages low.
18 A sample survey of Gulf migrants carried out by Graner and Gurung (2003) recorded a significant under-
representation of indigenous Tarai communities.
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